___Book Review_______________________________________________________________

THE CONTESTED VIEW OF HISTORY

A Critical Review of Helmut Zander's book: “Anthroposophy in Germany ” pub. 2007 Vandenhoek & Ruprecht

Reviewer: Joerg Ewertowski

Rudolf Steiner's intention to bridge the gap between Anthroposophy and the natural sciences has failed; at least in as far as its factual acceptance in the scientific world beyond Anthroposophy is concerned. To date no academically trained natural- or physical scientist has shown interest in Anthroposophy. A growing interest on the side of spiritual scientists and artists is hampered by Rudolf Steiner's natural-scientific alignment. Yet, from the side of theologians a plethora of remarkably factual studies of Anthroposophy have emerged; notable are those by Ruediger Sachau, Norbert Bischofsberger, Carlo Williams and the thoroughly researched doctoral thesis of Klaus Bannach.

For a doctoral thesis in historic science Helmut Zander is the first to present a comprehensive thesis, 2000 pages in two volumes: Anthroposophy in Germany , which, since its publication has caused great deal of controversy.

Helmut Zander attempts to delineate the history of Anthroposophy in Germany , by embedding it into the scientific context of the present. While this is a very promising goal, it becomes more interesting yet by it being placed into the contemporary context of historicism. [*]

[*]1. Theory that natural laws govern history beyond human control;

2. Belief in the uniqueness of historical periods, which can only be understood in their historical context. [Encarta Dictionary]

According to Zander, the focal point of the study is the relationship between Anthroposophy and Historicism. He aims to place Anthroposophy into the historical context of ‘the romantic natural sciences' of the time before its inception and the scientific environment at the time of inception. Both focal points are discussed towards the end of the first volume, centering mainly on the anthroposophical world-view, while the second volume deals extensively with the well-documented history of Theosophy and the Theosophical Society.

The author's interest is mainly in developmental ‘breaks and conflicts' of Rudolf Steiner while he merges Theosophy and Anthroposophy into one. And while the title promises a history of Anthroposophy, the subtitle [Theosophical world-view and societal practices 1884-1945] speaks only of the Theosophy. The reader is led to believe that both are the same.

And that is not all. Zander does not limit himself to the historic documentation of both movements, but he also wants to defend and prove beyond doubt the views of Historicism of the time as being valid today. In order to do that he uses two different means and measures: Anthroposophy is being embedded on the one side into the historical Historicism-context of the time of its inception, while deliberately ignoring its current and historical development. And further, Historicism is, without any further questioning, taken as valid and as accepted today as it has been in the past.

In other words: Anthroposophy in the context of Historicism is itself a historical phenomenon. The current context and/or the historical development of Historicism and Anthroposophy are not under consideration. Zander roots firmly in Historicism as unchangingly valid. From this point of view he interprets and over-interprets the implicit differences between Theosophy and Historicism to the point of animosity. He goes so far as to state that Theosophy is a movement that stands against all critical-historical assessments. [pp728] Theosophy's founders reacted against such cultural-historical assessments at the end of the 19 th century; [pp729] yet no one explicitly refuted the allegations. Rudolf Steiner did this to begin with, but his critical remarks about ‘critical-historical assessments and methodologies' don't have much of an impact within the plethora of anthroposophical contents; in other words there is no indication whatever that Anthroposophy can be seen as or is a reactionary movement against Historicism.

The Dual Stream of Historicism

The word ‘Historicism' is a polemic term used to differentiate it from other historic sciences.

When, at the end of the 19 th century Nietzsche and many others tried to find the meaning and import of historical research, they did so for the reason that the weighty multitude of historic materials available threatened to diffuse any and all discernible form. And something else entered consciousness, namely the observation that in the history of mankind nearly all values and truths change in the course of time. It became dramatically obvious that the validity of current values and truths had to be challenged. Hegel's philosophy of history wanted to systematize historical changes to avert confusion, but the shadow-side of his endeavour was the advocacy of a ‘world-spirit', which made people instruments and subjects of a higher authority. Very soon therefore the naivety of old was lost along with the belief and trust in eternal values and truths. Nietzsche was the first to diagnose Nihilism as the complete loss of all former truths and values.

Historicism nevertheless became a word of subject- identification rather than a by-word. [Passage left out] The historian Friedrich Meinecke [died 1954] saw the positive side of Historicism: “It allows individuals a place in history, adding colour and depth to the description of general historical facts.” Meinecke himself saw history as the result of individual decisions as well as of universal laws and values, neither of which can be codified, measured or judged abstractly outside the context of their time.

Zander does not agree; he also gives no reasons for his disagreement. Rather he follows the historian Otto Gerhard Oexle, whose historicism tends to a scientific approach: using a plethora of information, he reasons critically and destructively. In the following I will call this kind of historicism radical-historicism. Oexle maintains that radical-historicism is the only approach to history and attempts to undermine the validity of Meinecke's approach. Any attempt to overcome the views held by radical-historicism proponents , for instance by neo-Kantian historians, is seen by Oexle as irrelevant. In one stroke he annuls the work of such historians as Martin Heidegger and Hans Georg Gadamer. [Passage left out]

Zander and Oexle find it useless and irrelevant to consider human individual contributions to history; indeed meaning and import of human interactions are historically of no interest to them.

Immediately evident is Zander's lack of interest in Rudolf Steiner's historic significance. In stark contrast to Meinecke's sensitivity, Zander's approach is discriminating and degrading. His explanations ascribe none but the basest motives such as lust for power and influence to
Steiner, which stand in utter contrast to Steiner's personal/individual merits and achievements.

I want to use an example to demonstrate Zander's method. It is found in the first chapter of “Occult Science” and has the title “Getting to know the Spiritual World”. Zander does not even deign to mention the possibility of knowing spiritual worlds or spirituality as such. To him such things simply do not exist, much less does he prove their non-existence. Instead he immediately proceeds to the difference between self-initiation and initiation by other means. He does so in order to demonstrate that it is Steiner's ambition to be seen and accepted as a teacher. I quote the relevant passage:

“To begin with Steiner documents a phenomenon, which can only be answered polemically, and that is his critique of psychological techniques. [GA 13, 299-377] Steiner doesn't quote names and leaves the reader to guess whether the questions arose from his inner theosophical circle or from other sources. But he names problems of acceptability and cloaks these in a normative text about good or bad behaviour of the students. The smaller of the complaints is that Steiner published confidential information when he described the initiation processes. [pp303]Practically all other items relate to the authoritarian role of the teachers and possibly also to the demand for greater autonomy in regard to the students.

Already in the beginning passages Steiner agrees that cases of self-initiation exist [pp300] and that such cases are not part of the initiation processes. The arguments against such autonomous self-initiation are: ‘no one is supposed to interfere with the spiritual guides and guidance ‘.[pp301] It can reversely be concluded that Steiner himself transgressed the laws of the esoterically permissible, and he further defends his stance by stigmatizing self-initiation, warning that too much self-schooling smacks of passivity. Such cases ‘should not lead anyone to the belief that self-initiation is the one correct path by waiting what may happen, since they have nothing to do with the schooling of initiates. Indeed Steiner associates self-initiation with spiritism and a kind of misleading and impotent knowledge, which has been overcome by Theosophy.”

For the reader unfamiliar with Steiner's written work, this kind of research appears at first to be solid; more so since Zander quotes passages verbatim and gives their exact location. However, anyone who has read the original will notice at once that Zander does not deliver more than a forced interpretation and indeed formulates a perversion of the original: Steiner never says anything about self-initiation other than that the student should not strive to take shortcuts. He says: “ We will here not speak of self-initiation, since it can come about in life without the help of a schooling path. We will here look at how to develop those organs for perception consciously, which are nascent in the soul.” There is no passage in the entire text which would indicate that Steiner stigmatizes self-initiation or equates it with passivity. The logical contradiction to Zander ‘passivity-infected self-schooling” is a clear case of misleading interpretation, which is made more grave yet when we read a related sentence: “Steiner moreover mentions cryptically “ methods and means, which go beyond the consciousness of the student” [pp 302 ed. 1910 of Occult Science], and fails to mention whether he means drugs or other suggestive means.”

What Zander has written here bears the factual signature of his methodology of scientific research. Any and all relationship between Steiner's texts and Zander's interpretation of the same is loaded, deceitful and smacks of radical historicism in every line he means to diagnose.

Zander's methodology is not just non-hermeneutical it is anti-hermeneutical. [From the Greek: Hermeneuein. Hermeneutic : using thoughts to find meaning in a text, to interpret, to formulate.] [Collins Dictionary] In my opinion there are only two ways of reading and understanding it: either Zander is a deluded or he means to delude. It is quite clear that he counts on the fact that few people are familiar with Steiner's written work, while others approach it with prejudice. It is a shame that this book on Anthroposophy has been found ‘scientifically researched' enough to serve and be acceptable as a doctoral thesis.

Choosing the Weakest Target

Zander's basic perspective and parameter is primarily the meaning and reality of historical research rather than Anthroposophy; he seeks to answer the question whether spiritual-scientific positions are justified and justifiable in today's world. His approach from a radical-historicism perspective stands not only in a tension-filled contrast to anthroposophical intentionality and reality, but also, and no less radically so, to Gadamer's hermeneutics and above all to the hermeneutic approach of Schleiermacher and his colleagues. Zander's phenomenology in the field of academic spiritual-scientific research is bizarre, exotic and full of prejudice. And that is an easy thing to do in the case of Anthroposophy, as it is relatively unknown, doesn't speak the common scientific language and has no lobby in the world of science. He obviously picked the least known- and therefore the easiest target to attack for his purposes, and furthermore he lacks the chivalry of other authors, who prefer to tackle their ‘adversaries' strengths. While he avoids frontal attacks, he nevertheless uses hidden persuaders to present Rudolf Steiner as a liar and plagiarist, rather than present his hypotheses as genuine research; the attempt clearly aims at the destruction of Steiner's moral integrity. Zander isn't at all bothered by this nor does he feel the reprehensibility of his undertaking. What does he want to achieve? Does he want to fan the flames of animosity, while staying in the background as the authority? Or is he really so naive as to believe that spiritual-scientifically researched insights are lies by necessity and that their value only lies in the aggrandisement of the author's self-image?

The Dual Denial of the Consciousness Soul

Zander wants to cement the thesis that there is no such thing as historical truth, that history is but an accumulation of facts in endless quantity from a collection of an infinite number of sources, and he follows from there that all spiritual truths are relative [personal opinions] and that the use of reasoning thinking allows no more than “destructive” criticism.

He attacks a spiritual stream [of Anthroposophy] which rests on the counter-argument, and he does so without ever considering its possible merits. His radical-historicism uses/abuses Anthroposophy in order to prove radical historicism. And in doing so he showers the reader with an overwhelming amount of monocausal material and interpretations. He is a yarn-spinner and a caricature of the very item he wants to disprove: individualistic reasoning and ego-capacity in a changing world.

Philosophic excursions into historical ideas are disapproved even though he wants to prove their validity. Human history as such is meaningless, since he is unable to formulate any meaning-giving ideas of value. Radical pluralism is the demand, while at the same time the implication is –in contradiction to his thesis- that lasting truths and values are nonsensical.

He speaks of “breaks” in Steiner's biography, which –he assumes- permanently changed him, but stereotypically the only outcome [of the changes and breaks] is Zander's obnoxious and monomaniacal psychological inference of the lust for power and control.

On the thesis that history does not show stages of human development and/or evolution, the possibility of change is frozen out; also the facts, which might contradict his thesis, are not even considered. We see here in a classical example that ideas need creative thought-processes, and that the true reality is perceived only in the light of ideas.

I am not defending or denying his hypothesis that there were “breaks” and changes in Steiner's biography, nor that some anthroposophical descriptions tend to render them irrelevant, -but the tiring repetitions served to the reader, the sameness of the patterns, are in contradiction to Zander's stated intent. It is fatal that he is completely oblivious to the reasoned fact that the same happens to him- the proponent of radical historicism- which he set out to combat. His idea is a totalitarian one, and since he is unable to experience an idea as idea through thinking rather than take it as a fact, he becomes totalitarian and unfree in dealing with it.

If this weren't true, Zander would have the equanimity necessary to integrate his insight into sense-reality pluralistically in defence of his position in a pluralistic world. The fact that he uses totalitarian methods bears witness to his entanglement in an idea rather than the thoughtful consideration of the same and its relationship to himself, which is the signature of the consciousness soul: the ability to relate between the content of a statement and its testimonial evidence. The consciousness soul, in its capacity to be self/other-observant while thinking and perceiving, is immune against the performance of self-contradiction, since in self-observance it accesses the self-evidence of rightness and truth without having to use external props. Zander lacks consciousness-soul capacities and he cannot differentiate between method and idea/topic. The same is true for all theosophical authors. In their world-view the reality of the organizing centre, the “I am” is non-existent.

Zander is ignorant –both methodically and thematically – of differentiating to any distinctive degree between Theosophy and Anthroposophy or to understand the concept of the consciousness soul. To theosophists it was an unknown entity. In Theosophy the fourth member [Wesensglied] in the spiritual constitution of the human being is called the ‘animal soul' or ‘kama-manas'. [Judge, Besant] It is but a weak representation of the ‘manas', the fifth member [in Anthroposophy]. Rudolf Steiner was the first to bring to awareness the evolving individual “I” capacity as part of the consciousness soul: the observing, differentiating and creative power of the human being. Rudolf Steiner made it possible in Anthroposophy to differentiate between consciousness soul and' manas', by highlighting their “I”-centred relationship with the fourth member, the reasoning soul/kama-manas. In the ideational history of mankind this is the first time that the “I am” capacity is included in the canon of the human soul-spiritual constitution. [Wesensglieder] Also the specific developmental possibilities arising from the knowledge, namely the transformative and inclusive powers of the “I”, which engender and make possible the transformation of physical being into spiritual being, escaped Zander completely. It also escaped him that a new developmental idea entered the ideational history of mankind, a development which takes us beyond the German Idealism and therefore also beyond historicism. This fact alone makes historicism into an anachronism.

The complete absence of meaning and sense in the history of mankind that Oexle and Zander want to prove can only be suffered rather than be searched for. While its impossibility must not be naively believed, we must never lose the courage to also consider it possible. Only then will we have the means to experientially track the scope of meaning and development. Nietzsche's predicted rise of Nihilism would become a reality if total relativism began to reign; more so if it is sought for –and at all cost-, as if it were impossible to even infer sense and meaning to life and development.

The Dilemma of Historians and Anthroposophical Insights

Anthroposophy is indeed a relatively vulnerable outsider in the arena of spiritual sciences of the day, but perhaps it isn't as quite as ‘harmless' to the ideas of historicism as assumed. No other spiritual stream manifests as much practical applicability as Anthroposophy and none has as many really new ideas, which serve to demonstrate the developmental potential of ideas. This is dangerous because it exposes historicism as developmentally retarded.

Hegel manifested his philosophical treatise of historic development in a brilliant, grandiose and seemingly perfect design. But in the factual world of history, philosophy and art little has been added since. Technical advances have further highlighted the shortcomings of the philosophical side of German Idealism. Ranke and later Meinecke, in the footsteps of Schleiermacher, raised the historic significance of human individuality into consciousness. The individual human being, they said, must not be instrument of or subject to a ‘world-spirit'. Historians must include the contributions of individuals in considering the scope of historical processes and their development; indeed the development and freedom of the individual human being must be the central focal point. It is absurd to leave individuals and their contributions out as insignificant. In order to fully work out the importance and significance of the individual , the outline of the history of the human race had to be reclaimed. First formulated during the time of German Idealism, it has since become clear that the single individual's contribution can be fully appreciated only in the context of common-human historical realities.

This dilemma has been the crux, the common problem for historians and philosophers; it is indeed the reason for the rise of historicism in the first place. It now serves us to highlight the great spiritual-scientific significance of Anthroposophy, its insights powerful enough to solve this - one of mankind's most fundamental- riddles.

The history of mankind and reincarnation must be understood to belong together. The single person, -the autonomous individual human being- and the path of mankind in the course of history are inextricably linked. This insight coupled with logical, clear thinking will end the dilemma of historicism.

When Lessing wrote down his idea of the “Cultivation and Education of the Human Race” [Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts] he took reincarnation into account, and he seeded an idea, which took time to germinate, since the meaning of the human individuality had yet to be fully grasped. Anthroposophy has for the first time been able to show the dynamics of human beings individually and communally as equal partners in the making of history. Anthroposophy shows how increasing individuation loosened the bonds that united individuals with their heritage of nationality and family, and how, due to the reality of the Mystery of Golgotha, we are now in the position to form new bonds through an inclusive sense of brotherhood for our individual and common humanity. Essentially this is also the meaning of Christianity, which Ernst Troeltsch sought to establish against the relativism of historicism. He however had to rely on the belief of reincarnation rather than allow the idea to become experiential knowledge.

We have now shown the true relationship between Anthroposophy and Historicism. Anthroposophy is not a reactive movement against Historicism, bent on restoring outdated historical truths. Anthroposophy with its high level of integrity and fundamentally sound ideas provides solutions to historical dilemmas worthy of consideration, quite independent of future value judgments.

The path Zander took in writing his books is all too predictable as well as tragic: he is one of the first Catholic theologians to write a dissertation on Christianity and reincarnation. Yet he found it useful to dismiss the latter, since it doesn't fit his image of the Christian human being or his world-view. He followed it up with a topic, studying the idea of reincarnation within the context of history in the Western world. Here also he approached his studies with scepticism and disapproval. And to top it all off he uses Anthroposophy to prove his point and to solidify his views steeped in radical-historicism in order to prove that the idea of development either individual or global is doubtful.

If we take the opposite side we see more closely what Zander aimed for. I have no doubts that there are those in the circle of academically trained spiritual scientists who can see the one-sidedness and internal contradiction of Zander's study. Anthroposophy has the chance to make it more clear yet.

Translation by Eva Knausenberger, March 2008 New Zealand

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